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T
he topic of state trading enterprises (STEs) has attracted much attention lately in trade
law circles. There are two main reasons for this. First, the United States focused much
attention on STEs leading up to the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in
December 1999. Second, many of the former or current centrally planned economies (e.g.,
China) have applied for WTO membership and maintain STEs. These applications for
WTO membership raise questions about how STEs fit in with WTO principles and rules.
As a result, interest in STEs is currently very high.
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This paper provides a Canadian perspective on the debate about state trading enterprises in
the World Trade Organization. STEs carry out important economic functions as part of
national policies. STEs can do this without distorting competitive equilibrium in trade. From
an economic and legal standpoint, STEs can properly function within the WTO system. The
paper comments on why WTO rules on STEs may be practically meaningless, given the lack
of application of the STE rules in WTO dispute resolution. The suggestion is made that the
direction of legal inquiry into STEs should focus on the question of trade influence, rather
than on the political question of government control of STEs. The real economic trade
effects of STEs are the important aspects of STE study, not the ideological aspects of STE
governance. 
Keywords: ideology; state trading; subsidies; unfair trade; WTOThis paper will provide a Canadian perspective on the STE debate. The majority
Canadian view is that STEs have a legitimate place in world trade. They carry out impor-
tant economic functions for the benefit of Canadian citizens. They can do this without dis-
torting competitive equilibrium in trade. From an economic and legal standpoint, Canada’s
view is that STEs can properly function within the WTO system. 
This paper provides a perspective on two further issues. First, the WTO rules on STEs
may be practically meaningless. Second, the debate on STEs has been wrongly focused by
the United States on the political question of government control of STEs instead of on the
real economic issue of the trade influence of STEs. The paper suggests a redirection of the
legal inquiry in the direction of trade influence.
Why Are STE Rules Such a Hot To p i c ?
Why Are There WTO Rules on STEs?
The introductory question to the topic of STEs is: What is it about STEs that the WTO is
trying to regulate? This question is answered by recognizing that the original GATT con-
tracting parties wanted to prevent governments from doing indirectly what they were
agreeing not to do directly. They wanted to stop each other from circumventing the rules
that they had adopted. Governments were willing to agree, in GATT 1947,1 to a certain
extent at least, not to use STEs to avoid commitments on trade measures like tariffs, sub-
sidies, and quantitative restrictions. This agreement limiting the use of STEs to activities
that comply with GATT rules remains part of WTO rules today.
STEs in Trade Generally
The rules in GATT 1947 regarding state trading applied to all types of trade in both pri-
mary and processed products. At that time, tariffs and market access were the main con-
cerns. Export subsidies were not a primary concern. In fact, GATT permitted the continued
use of export subsidies for primary products, even after it restricted their use for manufac-
tured or processed products in 1955. The STE rules continued to apply to all products, but
against this backdrop of other GATT rules.
Trade in agricultural and food products dominates international trade by STEs, but
other products have their trade conducted by STEs as well. State trading in general is wide-
ly practised throughout the world with respect to a variety of products. At one time trade
by STEs included at least one quarter of total world trade.2 This has led to numerous exam-
inations of the international treatment of state trading.3 For example, trade in minerals has
a significant STE component. The issue of subsidized mineral production by STEs and
compliance with GATT rules has been examined in the past.4 The issue of GATT rule com-
pliance by STEs is relevant to industrial products as well as agricultural products.
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State trading enterprises play a significant role in international agricultural trade. The inter-
national trade operations of STEs made up 10 percent to 15 percent of the total trade of
GATT member countries in 1962,5 and the percentage has likely grown since then. Exact
statistical analysis is difficult to do considering the confidential nature of this type of infor-
mation. A study of State Trading Notifications to the GATT Secretariat for the period 1980
to 1994 showed that 68 percent of the reporting countries had an STE involved in grain and
cereal trade, and 60 percent had one involved in dairy products trade.6 Since the WTO was
created in 1995, these Notifications show 121 STEs in countries trading in agricultural
products.7 STEs have a prominent place in international agricultural trade, and therefore
have an influence on Canada’s export trade.
In 1995, Canada’s exports of agricultural products were valued at just over $20 bil-
lion.8 This represented about one-third of Canada’s agricultural output.9
Canadian exports of agricultural products involve state trading enterprises such as the
Canadian Wheat Board, the Canadian Dairy Commission, and the Ontario Bean Producers’
Marketing Board.10 These Canadian agencies had combined export sales in 1995 of over
$6.2 billion. This amounted to over 30 percent of Canada’s agricultural export sales.
The world wheat trade is an example of the extensive role of STEs in world trade.
STEs have long played an important role in the world trade of this important strategic com-
modity. The extent of the involvement of state traders in this commodity was first analyzed
by McCalla and Schmitz in 1982.11 Their statistics on the share of the world wheat trade
handled by state trading exporters were recently updated.12 The statistics show that in the
period 1990 to 1994, exports by STEs made up 94 percent of the world wheat trade. These
statistics are an indication of the potential effects of STEs on the terms of world trade, espe-
cially in agricultural products.
Prior to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture13 in 1994, many GATT 1947
provisions did not apply to trade in primary agricultural products. Since many STEs dealt
with such products, they were not subject to GATT rules. But the Agreement on Agriculture
has brought GATTdisciplines to this area of trade. How will these rules now be applied to
STEs that trade or influence trade in agricultural products? The Agreement on Agriculture
is the most important reason that STEs are a contentious issue at this time.
A further WTO negotiating round was set to begin with a Ministerial Conference in
December 1999 in Seattle, Washington. Despite the fact that the ministers could not agree
on a negotiating agenda at that time, the WTO will attempt to continue the negotiating
process. It is expected that discussions regarding STEs will arise in these negotiations
because of the extensive role STEs play in agricultural trade. 
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The applications by China and others for membership in the WTO raise the question of the
application of STE rules to the centrally planned economies now in transition. Can the
rules be applied as they are? Will they be amended just for these new members, or for all
members? How will WTO rules on STEs deal with the problem of market access in for-
merly centrally planned economies?14 A good understanding of STE law and economics
will help deal with these applications for membership in the WTO, as these countries still
depend heavily on state trading enterprises to complete international transactions.
Formerly Centrally Planned Economies
The expansion of exports from formerly centrally planned economies has also been a rea-
son to reconsider the STE rules. These economies still conduct much of their trade through
agencies controlled by the state even though they are members of the WTO. There has been
a similar growth in export trade from developing countries, which often use state trading
agencies to manage trade. The increase in exports from these economies encourages an
examination of how STE rules apply to them.
STE Rules as Part of the WTO Institution
As illustrated, trade by STEs has a major impact on the Canadian economy. Until 1994,
GATT did not regulate the subsidized trade of agricultural products by STEs.  An example
of this absence of regulation is the recent wheat subsidy war between the United States and
the European Union. Both governments arguably used STEs to administer subsidies.
Neither the main protagonists, nor the other WTO members who were hurt by the subsi-
dies, attempted to use GATT rules to control the subsidy war. Neither government had the
political will to stop the subsidy battle, even when it beggared their treasuries and wreaked
havoc on third countries, including Canada. This provided the impetus to try to improve
the GATT rules in the Uruguay Round. Progress was made in the Agreement on
Agriculture. The subsidy battle is, however, heating up again. Is there any hope that WTO
rules regulating STE activities in the area of agricultural trade will prevent such subsidy
battles and their disastrous effect on Canadian agriculture?
The Unfair Trade Complaint
The main U.S. complaint about export-oriented STEs is that they engage in unfair trade.
The unfair trade complaint is a serious challenge to liberalized rules of trade. The basic
argument is that trade is fair only if all trading states have similar kinds of domestic poli-
cies. The debate becomes heated when some countries, such as the United States, allege
that they do not use STEs and argue that their policies are undermined by those countries,
for example, Canada, that do use them as part of their domestic policy.15
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excessive price cutting.16 The question then becomes: What is “excessive” price cutting?
Is it selling below the world price established by others? Is it selling below cost of pro-
duction and marketing for the STE? Is it selling below the costs of other competitors? An
examination of STE economics would help to address these questions about the meaning
of unfair trade. 
Domestic Policy Implications
It is especially important to consider some of the terms of GATT 199417 because of the
potential impact that they have on domestic policy. For example, the GATTrules that apply
to STEs will have an impact on organizations such as the Canadian Wheat Board and the
Canadian Dairy Commission. These rules affect the Canadian Wheat Board monopoly with
regard to the purchase of wheat and barley from Canadian producers and with regard to its
selling practices. The United States has just succeeded in a WTO complaint about certain
practices of the Canadian Dairy Commission.18 Thus, STE rules have an impact in all areas
of domestic and trade policy.
What Are the WTO Rules?
G ATT Article XVII
The heart of WTO rules on STEs is:
Article XVII: State Trading Enterprises19
1. (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enter-
prise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclu-
sive or special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involv-
ing either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general princi-
ples of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for govern-
mental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.
(b) The provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to
require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of
this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with
commercial considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability,
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the
enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchas-
es or sales.
(c) No contracting party shall prevent any enterprises (whether or not an enterprise
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ing in accordance with the principles of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this para-
graph.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply to imports of prod-
ucts for immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not other-
wise for resale or use in the production of goods for sale. With respect to such
imports, each contracting party shall accord to the trade of the other contracting
parties fair and equitable treatment.
3. The contracting parties recognize that enterprises of the kind described in para-
graph 1 (a) of this Article might be operated so as to create serious obstacles to
trade; thus negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis
designed to limit or reduce such obstacles are of importance to the expansion of
international trade.
4. (a) Contracting parties shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the products
which are imported into or exported from their territories by enterprises of the
kind described in paragraph 1(a) of this Article.
(b) A contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing an import monop-
oly of a product, which is not the subject of a concession under Article II, shall,
on the request of another contracting party having a substantial trade in the prod-
uct concerned, inform the CONTRACTING PARTIES of the import mark-up on
the product during a recent representative period, or, when it is not possible to
do so, of the price charged on the resale of the product.
(c) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party which
has reason to believe that its interests under this Agreement are being adversely
affected by the operations of an enterprise of the kind described in paragraph 1
(a), request the contracting party establishing, maintaining or authorizing such
enterprise to supply information about its operations related to the carrying out
of the provisions of this Agreement.
(d) The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to dis-
close confidential information which would impede law enforcement or other-
wise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate com-
mercial interests of particular enterprises.
The legal rules in Article XVII are supplemented by further provisions in an
Interpretive Note20 and an “Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.”21
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The ongoing discussions about the definition of “state enterprises” appear to have culmi-
nated in a “working definition” of the term in the Uruguay Round “Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XVII” of GATT 1994. The working definition is:
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards,
which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including
statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence
through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.
This definition appears to be a functional definition which focuses on the exercise of
special rights or privileges that have an influence on the level or direction of imports or
exports. This represents a shift from the early U.S. Suggested Charter institutional
approach which focused on the control of the enterprise exercised by government. The
working definition is the definition that will likely be used by GATT panels if necessary.
Despite this working definition of STEs from the WTO, the United States seems to
maintain a different view of what an STE is. In a report by the Congress in 1996,22 the
United States General Accounting Office stated:
STEs are generally considered to be enterprises that are authorized to engage in
trade and are owned, sanctioned, or otherwise supported by the government.
This different description of STEs may yet lead to disputes about what an STE is.
Tinkering with the definition will not mean much in legal circles until some WTO mem-
bers are challenged on their STE practices in the dispute resolution process.
Notification Requirements
In addition to the substantive obligation of non-discriminatory treatment set out in Article
XVII (1) a, WTO members have an obligation to notify the WTO about the trade activities
of their STEs. The purpose of this obligation is to provide information that will give trans-
parency to the activities of the STE so that compliance with the substantive obligations can
be addressed. For example, how can it be determined if an STE exporter is subsidizing
sales, if information is not publicly available to determine prices or other transaction infor-
mation? This has been a vexing legal problem since GATT1947 first attempted to prevent
rule circumvention by STEs.
The  transparency  issue  has  gained  new  significance  with  the  Agreement  on
Agriculture. Now that more STEs are the subject of scrutiny in the area of agricultural
products, there are new demands for information from these STEs. These demands arise
from the needs of WTO members to have economic data to assess the issues of subsidies
and trade influence. It is important, however, to assess what the real legal obligations of
WTO members are regarding disclosure about STEs. The obligations are contained in the
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part of the notification process.
Notification Deficiencies
The notification requirement has four key deficiencies:
1. The lack of definition of an STE in Article XVII. This leads to confusion and dis-
agreement about what enterprises have to be reported.
2. The lack of an enforcement or review mechanism for the notifications.
3. The provisions of Paragraph 4 (d) provide:
(d) The provisions of this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to dis-
close confidential information which would impede law enforcement or oth-
erwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises.
This provision again raises the question of the meaning of commercial interest and
allows members to claim an exemption from the provision of full economic details
of their enterprises’ operations.
4. The notification provisions are unclear about what is required from WTO members
with respect to enterprises that hold special rights or privileges from sub-national
governments. It is not apparent from the questionnaire on STEs that these enterpris-
es have to be reported, even though they may have significant trade effects.
Attempts to address the deficiencies of the notification process were made in the 1994
“Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII.” A working definition of STEs was
supplied. A counter-notification process was set up, using the Council for Trade in Goods
and a working party to consider the adequacy of notifications.23 The working party, work-
ing on a new questionnaire and on an illustrative list of state trading relationships, has
reported once and is continuing its work. In addition the WTO Secretariat has provided a
background paper containing a review and analysis of STE notifications.24 There is also a
Handbook on Notification Requirements available to WTO members.25
The provisions of Paragraph 2 of the Understanding are relevant to the transparency
obligation. Paragraph 2 provides:
2. Each Member shall conduct a review of its policy with regard to the submission of
notifications on state trading enterprises to the Council for Trade in Goods, taking
account of the provisions of this Understanding. In carrying out such a review, each
Member should have regard to the need to ensure the maximum transparency possi-
ble in its notification so as to permit a clear appreciation of the manner of operation
of the enterprises notified and the effect of their operations on international trade.
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of Article XVII. The tension between “maximum transparency” and “commercial inter-
ests” will continue to be a main feature of the debate on STE regulation. There is recogni-
tion that private firms do not always provide public information about their businesses and
that STEs should not be held to a higher standard when they are in competition with these
private firms. The balancing of the transparency and commercial interests will continue to
demand consideration by WTO members.
The key legal point to note in the deficiencies in the notification process is that the
obligation to provide information is always subject to the protection of the commercial
interests of the STE. Thus the legal obligation is largely meaningless. So Paragraph 4 of
Article XVII is not an effective way of policing rule circumvention by STEs. Other meth-
ods will have to be used to ensure STEs are subject to WTO rules.
C a n a d a ’s Notifications
The WTO requires each WTO member to file a notification identifying its STEs. Canada
has identified the Canadian Wheat Board, the Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) and the
Ontario Bean Marketing Board.26 The notification identifies the special rights and privi-
leges of each agency, and their volumes of business activity.
U.S. Notification 
The WTO and the Commodity Credit Corporation
The United States is a frequent critic of state trading enterprises. The United States,
however, may be guilty of throwing stones while living in a glass house. It can be argued
that the United States Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) is a state trading enterprise
with the potential for trade influence in the area of agricultural products.27
The CCC administers an export subsidy program called the Export Enhancement
Program (EEP). The program purports to help products produced by U.S. farmers meet
competition from other subsidizing countries, especially the European Union. Under the
EEP, the CCC pays cash to exporters as bonuses, allowing them to sell U.S. agricultural
products in targeted countries at prices below the exporters’costs of acquiring the products.
The CCC is clearly a state enterprise that has special rights or privileges that result in
the subsidization of exports. On the classic Article XVII description of an STE, the CCC
will be caught by the WTO rules. Classifying the CCC as a state trader makes sense
because it has substituted political for economic objectives in its operations.
The United States has officially recognized the CCC as a state trader in the past, in its
Notifications regarding state trading to GATT and the WTO. However, the most recent
State Trading Notification by the United States does not include the CCC. The United
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ition since it does not actually make purchases or sales of product.
If the CCC is not a state trader because it does not make purchases or sales, do the actu-
al exporters become state traders? On the working definition set out above, they likely are
state traders. They have the special privilege of receiving a cash bonus or subsidy on the
export of a product. Their sales directly influence the level or direction of trade in a prod-
uct. Perhaps Cargill is the real state trader when it benefits from the EEP. In any event, the
real issue in international law is whether the export subsidies that do exist contravene WTO
subsidy rules. As long as existing subsidies fit within the WTO caps on product volumes
and budget outlays, it does not matter whether they are made directly by the U.S. govern-
ment or indirectly through the CCC.
Subsidies Through STE Exporters
F
or STE exporters, the real trade issue is whether or not the STE is being used to sub-
sidize exports. This is the allegation made by the United States against Canada’s CWB.
It has been suggested that either the government or the producers are subsidizing exports
of wheat and barley, and that this is unfair competition that distorts trade. What are the
facts?
A recent study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) detailed the producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for wheat and barley. The
results, in $ US per tonne, in 1998 were:
Europe U.S.  Canada
Wheat $ 141         $ 61            $ 8
Barley $ 171         $ 49            $ 5
Which system creates unfair trade competition? Is it really important to world trade
that Canada conducts its wheat and barley trade through an STE? The Canadian view is
that we are the trade innocents in this area. The CWB is being unfairly targeted by U.S.
trade officials for ideological reasons, not economic ones.
Why is this happening? In my view it is happening because U.S.-based multinational
grain corporations would like to see the CWB out of business. This would leave our grain
producers at the mercy of the oligopoly of a few large grain buyers. The market quality pre-
miums and marketing profits, which are now returned to producers by the CWB, would be
available for capture by the grain companies.28 The domestic benefit of an STE would be
sacrificed to multinational corporate power.
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T
he U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) has recently examined the operations of
the CWB and found that it did not contravene WTO rules. In a special report to
Congress,29 the GAO studied the CWB in detail and concluded that the CWB did not vio-
late any existing trade agreements. Further, in a December 1998 report from USDA
Economics Research Service (ERS) titled Agriculture In The WTO,30 ERS researchers
found that “only a few of the major agricultural STEs examined have the potential to sig-
nificantly affect world trade … .” They found potential only, and no effect in fact. So the
facts found by the United States government in its own studies do not support the political
allegations levied against the CWB.
The Canadian Dairy Commission (CDC) is another important STE to Canadians. It
controls milk pricing in Canada through a supply management and import control system.
It was recently challenged by the United States through the WTO. A complaint was made
that Canada was subsidizing some milk product exports (e.g., cheese) through subsidized
pricing by the CDC.31 The U.S. complaint was upheld by a WTO panel decision and an
appeal.32 The important thing to note about this case is that in a 200-page panel judgement,
there is absolutely no mention of STEs! None!
If STEs are such an important issue to U.S. politicians and trade representatives, why
were the STE provisions not invoked in the WTO battle over the CDC? In my view, the
case shows that the U.S. government believes that the WTO subsidy rules can be applied
against an STE without relying on Article XVII.
This viewpoint leads to the question of why the United States feels it must focus atten-
tion on STEs in WTO trade negotiations. In fifty years of GATT history, from 1949 to
1999, there has never been a case that relied on Article XVII to regulate an STE exporter.
In fact there have only been a handful of cases involving STEs at all. So if there is no his-
tory of the United States using the STE rules, and if the United States recently passed up
the chance to use Article XVII in the Canadian Dairy Commission case, is the U.S. nego-
tiating position on STEs just empty rhetoric?
How Should STEs Be A s s e s s e d ?
I
t appears the U.S. view of STEs is that they are inherently bad for trade and must be reg-
ulated out of existence. At least the rhetoric used by U.S. elected officials leaves this
impression. This U.S. view appears rooted in laissez-faire economic ideology that suggests
any government involvement will distort a free trade competitive equilibrium. Should this
ideological view of STEs be used to assess their effect on trade? 
Canada’s view is that the real question that international law makers should ask about
STEs is what effect they have on trade prices, quantities and directions. If we accept that
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the rules is a competitive equilibrium of price and quantity in the free trade market. If the
question is “what trade effect does an STE have?” the answer depends on the market in
which the STE operates.
Another way to state this view of STEs is to say that they are not inherently good or
bad from an economic or trade perspective. They may produce good or bad results when
compared to a competitive market result, depending on the type of market the STE oper-
ates in. If the STE has little market power to influence price or quantity traded when it is
compared to the other players in the market, then it will have little market result and need
not be of much regulatory concern. Hence, examining the market is as important as exam-
ining the STE. 
A proposal for the market-oriented approach to STEs is contained in The WTO
Regulation of State Trading Exporters.33 The author outlines the need for both law and eco-
nomics to be considered in dealing with STEs through the WTO. The thesis suggests that
an economic methodology focused on the market in which an STE operates would be help-
ful in assessing WTO rule compliance by STEs.
The Canadian government recently released a research paper,  “International Trade in
Agricultural and Food Products: The Role of State Trading Enterprises.”34 This paper pre-
sents an economic methodology for examining the trade effects of STEs in different types
of markets. It also presents a classification scheme for STEs depending on the type of mar-
ket they operate in. In our view this is much more useful than the USDA Economics
Research Service type classification based on the types of government control over STEs.
The Canadian classification system would allow identification of which STEs would have
a distorting effect. 
Hence, the assessment of STE activity through international trade rules needs to be
refocused. The 1994 working definition points in the new direction with its words:
in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases and sales the
level or direction of imports or exports.
The Canadian view is that STEs should be assessed by examining their real trade
effects from an economic methodology, not by criticizing their imagined influence from a
political or ideological perspective.
C o n c l u s i o n
T
his paper outlines why there is currently such a high degree of interest  in STEs. It con-
cludes that STE rules in the WTO are not being used to resolve disputes. The rules
may be practically meaningless since disputes are being resolved using other parts of the
WTO. If STE rules are to be effectively used, the focus should be on the real economic
trade effects of STE activity, and not on ideological aspects of STEs.
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